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Judicial Enforcement of NLRB
Bargaining Orders: What Influences the
Courts?
Terry A. Bethel* and Catherine A. Melfi**
INTRODUCTION
The basic policy of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)l is
one of majority rule: unions typically acquire the right to represent em-
ployees by convincing a majority of them that such representation is in
their best interest. Unions then seek voluntary recognition from em-
ployers or petition the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for an
NLRB-conducted election. The campaign period preceding the election
is often hotly contested, with both employer and union subjecting em-
ployees to speeches, letters, and other forms of propaganda. On occa-
sion, the NLRB finds that an employer's campaign practices threatened
employees or otherwise interfered with their ability to exercise free
choice. The NLRB's typical remedy is a rerun election and an order to
cease and desist from the unlawful campaign practices.2
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The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
2 See NLRA § 3 (amended 1947), 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1982) (establishing National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB)). The NLRB derives its remedial power from NLRA
§ 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). This section empowers it to order offenders to cease
and desist from their unfair labor practices "and to take such affirmative action includ-
ing reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies
of [the] subchapter . . . " Id. A detailed review of NLRB regulation of representation
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Sometimes, however, the NLRB determines that an employer's un-
fair labor practices are so severe that they cannot be rectified by the
usual remedies, and that despite the order to cease and desist, the coer-
cive atmosphere created by the employer will infect a subsequent elec-
tion. When the NLRB believes that a fair election cannot be held, it
often remedies the employer's unlawful conduct by issuing an order to
bargain with the union, commonly called a "Gissel3 bargaining order."
The Board can issue these orders regardless of whether the union lost a
previous election and, until recently, notwithstanding the fact that the
union has never had majority employee support.4
The NLRB's assumption is that Gissel bargaining orders protect
employees' rights by denying employers the fruits of their illegal con-
duct and by establishing the very relationship which the conduct sought
to destroy. At this point, one can only speculate about the overall effec-
tiveness of the remedy. However, one effect of the orders is certain: a
large number of the cases are reviewed by the courts of appeals.
This finding by itself is not surprising. NLRB remedial orders are
not self-executing. If an employer fails or refuses to comply with an
order, the Board's only recourse is to petition the appellate courts for
enforcement. 5 The Board is not required to seek enforcement, and in
many cases employers comply without further legal proceedings. In
bargaining order cases, however, the employer has engaged in unusu-
ally serious unfair labor practices. The Board might well believe that
judicial enforcement is necessary to encourage employer compliance.
campaigns is beyond the scope of this Article. It is sufficient to note that the Board
regulates both the content and the manner of campaign tactics employed by unions and
employers, including coercive speech and conduct. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC
TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 132-78
(1976). For a thorough review of NLRB practice, see Bok, The Regulation of Cam-
paign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act,
78 HARV. L. REV. 38 (1964).
1 The name comes from the Supreme Court's opinion in NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), in which the Court upheld the Board's authority to impose
remedial bargaining orders.
4 The issue in Gissel was the NLRB's authority to impose a bargaining order as a
remedy for an employer's serious unfair labor practices when the union had once
demonstrated majority support through signed authorization cards. In Conair Corp.,
261 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1982), enforcement denied, 721 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the
Board claimed authority to issue a bargaining order to remedy particularly egregious
employer conduct, even in the absence of a showing of union majority status. Conair
was overruled by the Board in Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578 (1984). For
further discussion of the issues these cases raise, see Bethel, Recent Decisions of the
NLRB - The Reagan Influence, 60 IND. L.J. 227 (1985).
5 See NLRA § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982) (describing appellate procedure).
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Similarly, "any person aggrieved" by the issuance of a Board reme-
dial order, such as the employer against whom the order operates, can
petition the court for review. 6 Given the bargaining order's controver-
sial nature and that such orders typically issue only against employers
who have fought vigorously against a union, employers might use the
review process to avoid, or at least to delay, the bargaining obligation.
This Article examines all reported appellate decisions in bargaining
order cases rendered over a four-year period.7 Part I begins by explain-
ing appellate courts' standard of review for bargaining order cases. Part
II identifies factors affecting courts' likelihood of enforcing the orders.
Part III examines data collected from this Article's study to note trends
in court enforcement and the variables affecting these trends. Part IV
reports the study's results. These results will assist lawyers contemplat-
ing judicial review of bargaining order cases by isolating the factors
that apparently motivate judicial decisions (and the importance of those
factors to particular courts). In addition, the results examine the extent
to which judicial opinions actually identify the basis of a decision. Not
surprisingly, opinions sometimes discuss issues that appear to have little
impact on the result, thus, deliberately or not, masking the real basis of
the decision.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the NLRA, both the existence of and the remedies for unfair
labor practices are matters entrusted primarily to NLRB discretion. As
the Supreme Court has said, "Congress could not catalogue all the de-
vices and strategems for circumventing the policies of the Act[, nior
could it define the whole gamut of remedies to effectuate these policies
in an infinite variety of specific situations."' Congress assigned the re-
sponsibility both to identify and to redress unfair labor practices to the
"Board as one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed by
6 See NLRA § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1982) (describing standing for aggrieved
party).
7 The cases in the study period include all those cases in which the Board issued
Gissel bargaining orders during fiscal years 1979 through 1982. A more comprehensive
description of the cases studied is included in Part III of this Article. See infra notes
41-53 and accompanying text. Cases were selected on a fiscal rather than a calendar
year basis because the NLRB calculates and reports information about cases and
caseloads on that basis. Using fiscal years facilitates comparisons between bargaining
order cases and other cases. Cases that were several years old were selected to study the
effect of the bargaining order relationship over time. Despite their age, some of the
cases are still open.
8 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
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experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge."9 Primarily
because of the NLRB's presumed expertise, Congress made the Board's
decisions subject to only limited judicial review. 10
By statute, courts of appeals have power to enforce, modify, or set
aside Board orders." Board findings of fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive.' 2 Moreover, Supreme Court decisions dictate
that lower courts give the Board's expertise considerable deference, par-
ticularly in formulating remedies. Nevertheless, some courts of appeals
have been aggressive in their review of NLRB bargaining orders.
These courts often criticize the Board for its inconsistency, its refusal to
articulate standards, and its failure to make detailed findings indicating
the need for the imposed remedy.
Although many factors might influence judicial decisions, courts re-
fusing to enforce Gissel bargaining orders typically identify one or more
specific considerations as prompting their actions. The reasons gener-
ally include one of three broad categories. Most often, courts criticize
the Board for not articulating appropriate general standards justifying
the issuance of Gissel orders, and for not identifying specific factors
warranting the use of the remedy in particular cases. 3 Also, despite the
Board's broad authority to identify and to remedy unfair labor prac-
tices, courts sometimes disagree with the Board's unfair labor practice
findings or with its conclusion that a bargaining order is the appropri-
ate remedy.' 4 Finally, courts sometimes justify nonenforcement by al-
luding to the "changed circumstances doctrine."
As its name implies, the changed circumstances doctrine takes ac-
count of changes between the time the Board's order issues and the
time of the court's decision. In cases of significant delay, changes occur-
ring in the interval between the employer's unlawful conduct and the
9 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
10 As Justice Frankfurter said in Phelps Dodge, "the relation of remedy to policy is
peculiarly a matter for administrative competence . Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at
194.
1 See NLRA § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982).
12 See id.
13 See, e.g., NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1971), not en-
forcing 178 N.L.R.B. 108 (1969) (discussing colloquy between court and Board). Sub-
sequently, the Board reissued the bargaining order at 195 N.L.R.B. 1109 (1972), only
to have the court once again refuse to enforce, NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 472
F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1972); see also J.J. Newberry v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 148 (2d Cir.
1981) (case from study period); NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d 208 (2d Cir.
1980).
14 See, e.g., Doug Hartley, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1982); NLRB v.
Amber Delivery Serv., 651 F.2d 57 (1st Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 22:139
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Board's order might also influence the courts. Changed circumstances
include both employee turnover and the restructuring or replacement of
management personnel. In many cases, the passage of time itself influ-
ences the courts' decisions. 5
In addition to factors the courts mention, other factors might also
contribute to the probability of enforcement. These factors include the
overall severity of the employer's unlawful conduct, the types of unfair
labor practices committed, the number of employees affected by the un-
lawful campaign (measured as the size of the bargaining unit), the
amount of employee support the union receives, and the identity of the
court hearing the appeal.
Any attorney contemplating resort to a court of appeals or any per-
son interested in predicting the probable action of a court must recog-
nize that courts most often frame opinions in standard judicial review
language.' 6 Courts that enforce Board orders, for example, typically re-
fer to the Board's responsibility to construe the statute in light of its
presumed industrial expertise and the limited role of judicial review.
Not infrequently, courts note that the issue is not what action the court
would have taken de novo, but whether the Board's action was reason-
able. Similarly, courts that deny enforcement to NLRB orders profess
adherence to a limited judicial role. However, they contend that the
Board's decision does not deserve deference because the Board did not
support its findings with substantial evidence, insufficiently explained
its reasoning, or adopted an unreasonable construction of the NLRA.
Appellate cases from the study group demonstrate this genre of judicial
explanation.
In United Oil Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB, 17 for example, the
Third Circuit explained its limited role in reviewing bargaining order
cases:
The binding precedent of Gissel teaches that the choice of remedy for un-
fair labor practices is an issue vested in the discretion of the Board. We do
not suggest that the courts do not have an important review function to
perform, but that we must be mindful of its proper scope. It is not relevant
whether we would have reached the same conclusion as the Board; it is
Is See, e.g., NLRB v. Knogo Corp., 727 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Village
IX, 723 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Marion Rohr Corp., 714 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1983).
16 A representative example is the statement of John Marshall: "Judgment for the
plaintiff; Mr. Justice Story will furnish the authorities." Frank, What Courts Do in
Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 654 (1932); see also Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive:
The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial Decisions, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929).
17 672 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
19881
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'not our function to substitute our judgment for the Board's on the propri-
ety of a bargaining order.'18
The Gissel case undoubtedly influenced the court's view. In Gissel, the
employer claimed that the Board had sufficient remedies for the em-
ployer's wrongful conduct without a bargaining order. The Court said:
It is for the Board and not the courts . . . to make that determination,
based on its expert estimate as to the effects on the election process of
unfair labor practices of varying intensity. In fashioning its remedies...
the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and an expertise all its own, and
its choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by the review-
ing courts. 19
In other cases, however, courts have been considerably more demand-
ing. In J.J. Newberry Co. v. NLRB, 20 for example, the Second Circuit
upheld unfair labor practice findings but disagreed with the Board
about their effect on the conduct of an election. Criticizing the NLRB
for its failure to take mitigating factors into account, including changed
circumstances, the court said:
Rather than react in knee jerk fashion to the presence of a hallmark viola-
tion, the Board must still analyze the nature of the misconduct and the
surrounding and succeeding events in each case in an effort to assess the
potential for a free and uncoerced election under current conditions3'
Similarly, in NLRB v. Marion Rohr Corp.,22 the same court took
the Board to task for the paucity of its analysis:
18 Id. at 1213 (citation omitted).
19 Gissel, 395 U.S. at 575, 612 n.32. Despite the clear direction of Gissel, other
courts have indicated that something less than the usual deference to the Board's ad-
ministrative expertise is warranted in reviewing remedial bargaining orders. In United
Services for the Handicapped v. NLRB, 678 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1982), for example,
the Sixth Circuit said that its usual deference is lessened when reviewing "the strong
and less preferred remedy of a bargaining order . . . ." Id. at 664. In NLRB v. Valley
Plaza, Inc., 715 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1983), the same court referred to its "more strin-
gent standard" in the review of bargaining order cases. Id. at 244; see also NLRB v.
Rexair, Inc., 646 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1981). Presumably, courts believe that they have
more responsibility on review in order to test the Board's conclusion that a bargaining
order should be substituted for the ordinary requirement that unions demonstrate ma-
jority status through the election process. The increased review, however, does not
necesssarily mean that courts will not enforce the order. For example, in both United
Services for the Handicapped and Valley Plaza, the courts upheld the Board's choice
of remedy despite the courts' assertion that they owed less deference to the Board than
in other cases.
20 645 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1981).
21 Id. at 153. For a discussion of the hallmark violations to which the court refers,
see infra note 48.
22 714 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1983).
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We write once again on this subject only to make clear our unwillingness
to enforce a bargaining order in the absence of a reasoned factual analysis
by the Board as to why a fair election cannot be held .... The listing of
unfair labor practices followed by the conclusory statement that a fair
election is no longer possible does not satisfy the Board's responsibility to
analyze the attending circumstances. 23
It is also possible to find cases that display judicial impatience with
the Board's work and less than faithful adherence to a limited standard
of review. In NLRB v. Pace Oldsmobile,24 for example, the court twice
refused to enforce a bargaining order imposed as a remedy for an em-
ployer's unfair labor practices. The violations included promises and
grants of benefits, interrogation, threats of discharge, 25 and discrimina-
tory layoffs. 26 The court harshly criticized the Board for its failure to
explain the basis of its remedial order 27 and for failing to determine the
23 Id. at 230-31. For other cases in which the courts of appeals disagree with the
NLRB's assessment of either the severity of the employer's unfair labor practices or
their effect on the likelihood of a free and fair election, see NLRB v. Loy Food Stores,
697 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1983); Doug Hartley, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 579 (9th Cir.
1982); NLRB v. Chester Valley, Inc., 652 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1981).
24 739 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984). The first Board order is reported at 256 N.L.R.B.
1001 (1982). The second order is reported at 265 N.L.R.B. 1527 (1982).
25 Such conduct is typically thought to violate NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(1) (1982), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 157 of
this title." NLRA § 7, 29U.S.C. § 157 (1982), details the protection provided to em-
ployees under the Act:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
158(a)(3) of this title.
Id. A full review of employer unfair labor practices and Board procedures for cor-
recting them is beyond the scope of this Article, which is limited to judicial review of a
specific unfair labor practice remedy.
26 This action would typically violate NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)( 3 )
(1982).
27 The court considered the case twice. In its initial review, the court refused en-
forcement, saying that the conclusion of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that a fair
election was impossible "was not preceded by the kind of analysis [required] before
enforcing so drastic an order." NLRB v. Pace Oldsmobile, Inc., 681 F.2d 99, 101 (2d
Cir. 1982). The court remanded the case, directing the Board to determine the potential
for a fair and free election, especially in view of significant changes in the composition
of the bargaining unit. Id.
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actual effect of the employer's unfair labor practices:
The Board made no attempt to determine if the unfair labor practices
continued to have an actual effect on the possibility of a fair and free
election .. relying instead on unsupported speculation about the impossi-
bility of conducting an election free from the lingering coercive effects of
[the employer's] unfair labor practices.28
Close examination of the opinion reveals that the court was guilty of
the same sin for which it condemned the Board. Although the Second
Circuit scolded the Board for its "unsupported assumptions" about the
effects of the employer's unfair labor practices on employees and criti-
cized it for failing to point to any specific evidence of effect, the court
itself engaged in similar speculations. Thus, it justified its refusal to
enforce the Board's bargaining order, in part, by referring to the ability
of the union to initiate a strike following the commission of the em-
ployer's unfair labor practices. 29
Despite the court's contrary assertion, this observation is not specific
evidence that the employer's conduct had no effect. Instead, the obser-
vation is merely an inference drawn by the court from the Board's fac-
tual findings. The fact that such an inference might be logical, or even
On remand, the Board reimposed the order. Pace Oldsmobile, 265 N.L.R.B. 1527
(1982). It reviewed the circumstances leading to the unfair labor practice findings and
concluded that the likely effect of the employer's conduct was "to instill in employees
the fear that union representation would be detrimental to their continued employment,
and that such fear would continue to be operative even in the event of a second elec-
tion." Id. at 1529. The Board found that the employer's egregious conduct, which in-
cluded discharge of a leading union activist, demonstrated the "lengths to which it
would go to stifle the employees' right of self-organization." Id.
The Second Circuit was not impressed. In its second decision, it again refused to
enforce the Board's bargaining order. Pace Oldsmobile, 739 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984).
Quoting from its previous opinions, some of which are also cases included in the study
period, the court said that "drastic" remedies like bargaining orders are not favored. Id.
at 110. They could be justified "only [when] there is a substantial danger that the
employees will be inhibited by the employer's conduct from adhering to the union." Id.
(citing J.J. Newberry Co. v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 1981)). The court
criticized the Board for engaging in a "superficial and conclusory analysis" and for
relying on "unsupported assumptions" to justify the bargaining order. Id. at 111-12.
28 Pace Oldsmobile, 739 F.2d at 112 (emphasis in original).
29 The Board had considered that fact, but had observed that at the conclusion of the
strike the employer had refused to reinstate three of the strikers and had reinstated a
fourth to a less desirable position. The Board said that this action, affecting nearly 20%
of the bargaining unit, was a further demonstration of the employer's "determination
not to accept its employees' union activities passively," which was likely to have a chil-
ling effect on both old and new employees. Pace Oldsmobile, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 1527,
1529 (1982).
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"right," is not the appropriate consideration. Rather, the question is
whether the Board's inferences, drawn from the same facts, are wrong.
If they are supportable (which does not necessarily mean "right"), then
the Board's order is entitled to judicial deference.30
Apparently, the court thought that the Board's inferences were not
supportable because there was no specific evidence of actual effect. It is
not entirely clear what sort of evidence the Board could muster. The
Board has long excluded from the evidentiary hearing testimony of em-
ployees about their reaction to employer campaign tactics. 31 That rule
is easily justified, especially given the credibility problems inherent in
such evidence and the questionable ability of employees, testifying sev-
eral months after the fact, to portray accurately the effect of previous
conduct.
Indeed, Getman, Goldberg, and Herman found that an employee's
union sympathies usually influenced her reaction to employer conduct
during an election campaign. 32 Union supporters were much more
likely than union antagonists to report coercion from unlawful (and
even lawful) conduct.3 3 Probably the most the Board can do, then, is to
consider evidence about what the employer did and to make assump-
tions about the likely effect of that conduct on employees.3 4
3o In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951), the Court said
that the requirement that NLRB findings must be enforced if based on substantial
evidence did not mean that "a court may displace the Board's choice between two fairly
conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice
had the matter been before it de novo."
31 See, e.g., Getman, Goldberg & Herman, NLRB Regulation of Campaign Tactics:
The Behavioral Assumptions on Which the Board Regulates, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1465,
1467 (1975).
32 J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELEC-
TIONS: LAW AND REALITY 121-22 (1976).
33 Id.
4 Although the issue before the Court was somewhat different, the same problem
was addressed in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). In discus-
sing the Board's role in the identification of unlawful conduct (as opposed to devising
remedies for their violation), the Court noted the "statutory plan for an adversary pro-
ceeding" and said:
Such procedure strengthens assurances of fairness by requiring findings on
known evidence .... Such a requirement does not go beyond the necessity
for the production of evidential facts, however, and compel evidence as to
the results which may flow from such facts .... An administrative agency
. . . may infer within the limits of the inquiry from the proven facts such
conclusions as reasonably may be based on the facts proven. One of the
purposes which led to the creation of such boards is to have decisions
based upon evidential facts . . . made by experienced officials with an
1988]
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As Getman, Goldberg, and Herman have noted, there is some ques-
tion about the validity of many NLRB behavioral assumptions. In Pace
Oldsmobile, however, the Second Circuit did not deny enforcement be-
cause it believed that the employer's unfair labor practices had no effect
on employee rights. It merely disagreed about what that effect was and
substituted its judgment for the Board's.
The same phenomenon can be observed in the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in NLRB v. Loy Food Stores. 5 Writing for the court, Judge
Posner refused to enforce a Board bargaining order entered in response
to the discriminatory discharge of two teenage employees during an or-
ganizational campaign. No one disputed that the teenagers were not
good employees. The Board, however, adopted the conclusion of the
administrative law judge (ALJ) that the teenagers' deficiencies had
been tolerated until they joined the union and that the reasons ad-
vanced for the discharges were merely pretextual. The Board found
that the employer knew about the employees' union activity - a find-
ing that may have been unnecessary in view of the Board's small plant
doctrine.3 6 The Board also found that the timing of the discharge, par-
ticularly following threats made by the employer, would have a coercive
impact on the remaining employees. In contrast, Judge Posner charac-
terized the employees as "teenage goof-offs" whose "discharge was un-
likely to throw fear into the adult workforce. ' '37 As did the Second Cir-
cuit in Pace, Judge Posner looked at the same evidence viewed by the
Board but simply disagreed with the Board's conclusions and substi-
tuted his own view of what the facts established. 8
Despite the apparent attention courts pay to the specificity with
which the Board addresses either its choice of remedy, the effect of em-
ployer conduct, or its conclusion that the election process has been de-
stroyed, this Article will not attempt to measure this effect on the
adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject which is entrusted
to their administration.
Id. at 799-800 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
31 697 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1983).
36 In order to establish a violation of section 8(a)(3), the Board typically requires a
showing of anti-union animus, with knowledge of an employee's union activity an es-
sential element of the burden. The small plant doctrine infers the requisite knowledge
in small establishments. For a general discussion, see 1 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW 194-95 (2d ed. 1983).
11 Loy Food Stores, 697 F.2d at 800.
38 In addition to Pace and Loy, other cases in which the court ignored the Board's
findings in favor of its own assessment of unlawful effect include NLRB v. Amber
Delivery Serv., 651 F.2d 57 (1st Cir. 1981); J.J. Newberry Co. v. NLRB, 645 F.2d
148 (2d Cir. 1981); see also supra note 23.
[Vol. 22:139
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probability of enforcement. Such explanations are subjective. It is diffi-
cult to test a court's assertion that it was motivated by the Board's ex-
plication rather than by some other criterion. At the very least, not all
courts require the same degree of specificity,3 9 and, perhaps more im-
39 For example, in contrast to the Second Circuit's opinions in J.J. Newberry, 645
F.2d at 148, and NLRB v. Marion Rohr Corp., 714 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1988), the
Third Circuit adopted a comparatively lenient standard in NLRB v. Permanent Label
Corp., 657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1981). Initially, a three
judge panel refused to enforce the bargaining order, criticizing the Board for relying on
a "conclusory statement" of the administrative law judge. 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2211,
2216 (3d Cir. 1981). The Board had held that a bargaining order was necessary be-
cause the unfair labor practices could not be remedied through traditional measures. Id.
Saying "we need more," the panel remanded the case for "specific findings" justifying
its choice of remedy. Id.
Subsequently, the Third Circuit heard the case en banc, vacated the panel decision,
and enforced the NLRB's bargaining order. 657 F.2d at 518-20. The court noted that
the requirement of the NLRB to specify the reasons for imposing a bargaining order
was not to limit the availability of the remedy. Id. at 521-22. Rather, the requirement
existed in order to facilitate judicial review and to add "predictability and stability" to
the Board's practice. Id. at 521. In this case, the administrative law judge had written a
53-page opinion describing and discussing the employer's unfair labor practices. Id. at
519. In justifying a bargaining order remedy, the court said that the ALJ did not act
"conclusorily." Id. at 521. Instead, the ALJ detailed several factors, including the
breadth of the unlawful conduct and the status of the wrongdoers, which warranted an
extraordinary remedy. Id.
Although the ALJ made no specific findings that traditional remedies would not
suffice, an omission found determinative by the three judge panel, the full court found
that fact unavailing:
We do not believe enforcement should be denied merely because the ALJ
did not write down the inescapable inference he made in recommending
that a bargaining order issue - that merely ordering the Company to
refrain . . . would not erase the effects of these threats ... and thus that
the possibility of a fair rerun election was slight.
Id. The court said that it was sufficient for the ALJ "to provide an extensive list of
factors" that influenced his decision to recommend an order to bargain: "If we were to
require that the ALJ also specifically state each inference drawn from these factors, no
matter how obvious it is from the opinion, we would elevate form over substance and
overstep the appropriate limits of judicial review of the Board's choice of remedy." Id.
The same theme was sounded by the court in its subsequent decision in NLRB v.
Eastern Steel Co., 671 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1982). In this case, the court again responded
to the employer's assertion that the Board should deny enforcement because of the
ALJ's failure to articulate specific reasons justifying her choice of remedy. Id. at 107.
The court said that such action would accomplish only two things: (1) it would delay
the collective bargaining obligation for the time necessary to rewrite the opinion and
subject it to a second court review; and (2) it would "teach the administrative law judge
a lesson in grammar." Id. at 109. The court said that neither effect supported a deci-
sion to deny enforcement. Id. The Court further asserted that the ALJ's reasoning was
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portant, some courts do not apply any consistent standard.40
II. FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROBABILITY OF ENFORCEMENT
To the extent that courts accept a more or less detailed explanation
of the Board's decision in different cases, their decisions might be influ-
enced by matters other than the Board's opinion. One such factor may
be the changed circumstances doctrine.
A. Changed Circumstances
Courts have often refused to enforce NLRB bargaining orders not
only because they question the Board's explication of motives or its
analysis of effects, but also because of the Board's failure to consider
subsequent events. Often, courts refer to changes in the composition of
the workforce or in the identity of management officials which come
adequate for purposes of review and noted that "we are not ... running a clinic in
legal writing." Id. For a discussion of the more stringent standard applied by the Sixth
Circuit in bargaining order cases, see supra note 19.
40 During the study period, for example, the Sixth Circuit at least twice refused to
apply the changed circumstances doctrine. See Exchange Bank v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 60
(6th Cir. 1984); Coil A.C.C., Inc. v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1983). In 1981,
however, without citing any of its previous cases, the same court refused to enforce a
bargaining order in NLRB v. Frederick's Foodland, 655 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1981), in
part because of an increase in number of bargaining unit employees and the passage of
time since the election.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Justak Bros. & Co. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1074 (7th
Cir. 1981), is even more interesting. As previously noted, the Seventh Circuit has been
particularly demanding in its review of bargaining order cases. Nevertheless, in enforc-
ing the bargaining order in Justak, the court said:
Elaborate explanations are not essential; indeed, scientific accuracy in esti-
mating the impact of unfair labor practices is impossible. Rather, we only
require that the Board delineate the factors that it considers in its estima-
tion, and describe how these factors have been weighed. . . . Once the
Board has spelled out the basis for its issuance of a bargaining order, this
court's review is limited to whether the Board abused its discretion.
Id. at 1081-82. In response to the employer's claim that employee turnover should
render the order inappropriate, the court said that it would not apply the changed
circumstances doctrine because allowing an employer to commit unfair labor practices
and then avoid the bargaining order by delay would be a "perversion of the Act's
purpose." Id.
The Seventh Circuit reviewed eight orders during the study period. It enforced only
two of those eight. In several of the cases the court criticized the Board's analysis of the
factors leading to the issuance of the order and, in at least two of the cases, was influ-
enced by changed circumstances. For discussion of the court's analysis, see infra note
41 and accompanying text.
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after the unfair labor practices but before the bargaining order issues.
The changes may also occur after the bargaining order but before judi-
cial review. The Board usually ignores the time lag, which is an inevi-
table consequence of the cumbersome administrative and judicial pro-
cess.41 Although some courts have deferred to the Board's decisions,
others have sharply criticized the Board for failing to consider changed
circumstances. 42
As stated previously, courts referring to "changed circumstances"
usually mean employee turnover both within the bargaining unit and
among key management personnel. Some cases do not directly address
these changes, referring principally to the delay itself (which can be
substantial). In the study period, for example, the average delay was
more than three-and-one-half years from the time of demand until
court order. 43 Even if the process works expeditiously, the entire proce-
dure, from demand to court decision, usually takes at least two years. 44
During that period one might expect significant turnover, at least
among unskilled workers, particularly if the Board's behavioral as-
sumptions are correct. That is, if an employer's unlawful conduct actu-
ally has a coercive effect, employees might choose to leave rather than
to incur the employer's wrath.
Application of the changed circumstances doctrine, then, might give
employers impetus to delay the process as long as possible to avoid the
bargaining order merely through the passage of time. In addition, there
is some evidence that a significant delay will contribute to the em-
" For the 108 appealed bargaining orders issued during the four-year period of this
study, the average amount of time between the union's demand for recognition and the
issuance of the bargaining order was 26.08 months. The average amount of time be-
tween the Board's order and the court of appeals decision was 16.80 months. Finally,
the average amount of time between the union's demand for recognition and the court
of appeals decision was 42.88 months.
42 For decisions in which the changed circumstances doctrine appeared influential in
courts' refusals to enforce a bargaining order, see NLRB v. Knogo Corp., 727 F.2d 55
(2d Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1983); NLRB v.
Frederick's Foodland, Inc., 655 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1981). For cases in which courts
enforced the bargaining order despite an assertion of intervening changes in the bar-
gaining unit, see Exchange Bank, 732 F.2d at 60; Piggly Wiggly v. NLRB, 705 F.2d
1537 (11th Cir. 1983); Justak Bros., 664 F.2d at 1074.
43 See supra note 41.
4 The Board's 1986 annual report, the most recent as of this writing, indicates that
at the close of the fiscal year (Sept. 30, 1986), the average age of cases pending Board
decision was 796 days. See 51 NLRB ANN. REP. app. at 272, table 23 (1986).
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ployer's chance of success in the rerun election often imposed in lieu of
the bargaining order. 41
Courts sometimes disagree about the significance of changed circum-
stances. If changed circumstances is a significant factor in the nonen-
forcement of bargaining orders, then the greater the time lag, the less
likely it is that a court would enforce an order. If, however, changed
circumstances does not matter in the determination whether courts will
enforce a bargaining order, then the time lag should be irrelevant.
B. Seriousness of the Unfair Labor Practice Campaign
Another pertinent inquiry is whether the seriousness of the em-
ployer's infractions influences the courts in bargaining order cases. Al-
though the Board has the primary responsibility both to identify unfair
labor practices and to devise remedies for them, courts reviewing the
remedy might be more willing to defer to Board judgment if they share
its perception of the seriousness of the employer's conduct. This is par-
ticularly true in bargaining order cases in which the Board's choice of
the "extraordinary" remedy differs from the Act's basic precept of ma-
jority rule. It is worthwhile, then, to examine the cases to determine
whether the seriousness of an employer's conduct relates to the chance
for enforcement.
An initial problem, however, is how to weigh the relative severity of
the conduct in each case. One possible way is merely to count the num-
ber of unfair labor practices in each case and determine if there is a
correlation between the number of offenses and the courts' decisions on
review. The sheer number of offenses, however, often is not an accurate
indicator of the severity of a particular campaign. Some section
8(a)(1) 46 violations, for example, are relatively minor and, even when
they appear in significant numbers, would not support the issuance of a
45 See Pollit, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. REV. 209 (1963).
4 NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C § 158(a)(1) (1982). This section makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." Id. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1982), grants to employees the "right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection ......
Typical NLRA § 8(a)(1) violations include election propaganda that threatens repri-
sals for employee union activity or promises of benefits to discourage union activity;
interrogation of employees about union sympathies; and surveillance of employees en-




bargaining order. In other cases, particularly in small units, the pres-
ence of one serious section 8(a)(3)47 violation might be sufficient to
warrant an order to bargain.
This Article measures severity by testing for the presence of certain
unfair labor practices that have been particularly influential in bar-
gaining order cases. These unfair labor practices, which are typically
violations of section 8(a)(1), section 8(a)(3), or of both sections, are said
to go to the heart of the Act by reinforcing employees' awareness of an
employer's control over the employees' economic destiny. This control
enables an employer to dictate the employees' actions regarding union
organization. These violations, sometimes referred to as hallmark viola-
tions, include discriminatory discharge, threat of plant closure, threat of
discharge, promise of benefits, grant of benefits, and plant closure.48
"Discriminatory discharge" refers to the discharge or layoff of em-
ployees in retaliation for the employees' union support. "Threat of
plant closure" and "threat of discharge" are overt or implied threats to
close a plant or to discharge employees if union activities do not stop.
The "promise of benefits" and "grant of benefits" refer to employers
offering employees incentives to cease their organizational efforts. Ex-
amples of such benefits include wage increases, increased break time,
and better holiday and vacation privileges. Finally, "plant closure" re-
fers to an employer's temporary or permanent shutdown, specifically as
a reaction to union organizing efforts. 49
The commission of one or more hallmark violations does not guaran-
tee that the NLRB will issue a bargaining order. Moreover, the Board
47 NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), makes it unlawful for an em-
ployer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment ... to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization .... In its most common form,
NLRA § 8(a)(3) prohibits the discharge of employees on account of union activity,
popularly referred to as discriminatory discharge. For further discussion of § 8(a)(3),
see R. GORMAN, supra note 2, at 209-19, 326-38.
4' In NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 602 F.2d 1100 (2d Cir. 1979), for example,
the court noted that "there were no dismissals for pro-union activities, no threats to
close down . . . and no actual use of force or physical violence, which usually are the
hallmarks in cases where bargaining orders issue." Id. at 1104; see also Hasbro Indus.,
Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 587 (1981) (granting benefits). Although the threat or use of physi-
cal force is sometimes referred to as a "hallmark" violation, few, if any, of the cases in
the study group evidenced that conduct.
49 All of these violations, except discriminatory discharge, are typically processed as
NLRA § 8(a)(1) violations, although they can also violate NLRA § 8(a)(3) if anti-
union motivation is proven. A full review of the distinction between § 8(a)(1) and
§ 8(a)(3) violations is beyond the scope of this Article. For a general discussion, see R.
GORMAN, supra note 2, at 326-38.
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will sometimes issue a bargaining order to remedy unfair labor prac-
tices other than hallmark violations. Nevertheless, any hallmark viola-
tion indicates a serious employer infraction. These infractions should
thus result in a positive effect on the probability of enforcement, except
perhaps plant closure. If a firm closes, and the shutdown is not tempo-
rary, courts of appeals might be less likely to uphold a bargaining or-
der, since there would be no employer with which to bargain.50 On the
other hand, these courts might expect employees to take seriously an
employer's threat of closure in retaliation for union activity. Such
threats, then, should increase the probability of enforcement, at least if
courts share the Board's assumption that threats increase an employer's
coercive impact. Predicting which of the remaining violations would
have the largest impact on the probability of enforcement is difficult.
Discriminatory discharge might produce different effects in different
cases. For example, the discharge of leading union advocates or the dis-
charge of a significant percentage of a bargaining unit might chill the
remaining employees' organizational interests. The Board ordinarily
makes this assumption. In contrast, the court in NLRB v. Loy Food
Stores5 thought that the firing of two "teenage goof off" employees was
unlikely to intimidate the adult workforce. In short, discriminatory dis-
charges might not produce the same coercive effect in all cases, or the
court of appeals' assessment of the effect of a discriminatory discharge
might differ from the NLRB's assessment. Still, given the perceived
seriousness of the offense, discriminatory discharge is likely to increase
the probability that courts will enforce an NLRB bargaining order.
The same is true for a threat of discharge.
Similarly, the grant of benefits could have different effects on the
probability of enforcement in different cases. A substantial wage in-
crease to all employees, for example, might be more likely to preclude a
fair election than would either an insignificant wage increase or the
grant of a slight increase in break time. The category "grant of bene-
fits," therefore, includes factors that increase the probability of enforce-
ment with different degrees of impact. The same is true for a promise
of benefits.
Threats of discharge or closure and promises of benefits (perceived
by the Board as a threat) can be either overt or implied. 2 Whether
50 Even when a plant is closed down, however, employers are obligated to bargain
with the union concerning the effect of that action on employees. R. GORMAN, supra
note 2, at 499.
11 697 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1983); see also infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
52 See, e.g., NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
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threats are implied is a matter of judgment, but the cases studied reveal
little disagreement on this issue between the courts and the NLRB.
C. Unit Size
Although both the Board and the courts sometimes speculate about
the impact of unfair labor practices on small bargaining units, predict-
ing the effect of unit size on the probability of enforcement is not easy.
On one hand, unfair labor practices could have a more significant im-
pact on employees in a small bargaining unit. That is, employees in
small units might feel more vulnerable than employees in large units.
Large unit employees enjoy anonymity and can appeal for support to a
larger, and presumably more powerful, group. This consideration
should increase the likelihood of enforcement in cases involving small
bargaining units.
On the other hand, employee turnover during the delay between the
demand for recognition and judicial review can result in a higher re-
placement rate of employees in a small unit than in a large one. High
employee turnover is one of the changed circumstances that might de-
tract from the likelihood of enforcement of a bargaining order. Thus,
the effect of unit size on the probability of enforcement is uncertain, a
priori, and depends on which aspect of unit size has the stronger
influence.
D. Union Strength
In bargaining order cases, a union need only have, at some point,
majority support of the bargaining unit's employees. However, the size
of the union majority may influence the appellate courts. If majority
size is a factor in courts of appeals decisions, then higher employee
support should result in a higher probability that a bargaining order
will be enforced. Elections were not conducted in all of the studied
cases, and the elections that were held were "tainted" (and therefore do
not accurately measure employee support for the union). Because of
these factors, this Article measures strength of employee support by
constructing the ratio of the number of employees in the bargaining
unit who sign authorization cards to the number of employees in the
bargaining unit.
E. Administrative Law Judge Recommendation
Almost all unfair labor practice cases heard by the Board have first
been tried before an administrative law judge. The ALJ, functioning in
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a quasi-judicial capacity, conducts a formal hearing and typically rec-
ommends an order. The NLRB is bound by neither the ALJ's factual
findings nor her assessment of the impact of allegedly unlawful con-
duct. Ordinarily, however, the Board gives ALJ findings significant
deference.53 Even so, in some cases, the Board will issue a bargaining
order when the ALJ has not recommended one.
In the sample studied, the Board issued a bargaining order despite
no ALJ recommendation in relatively few cases. The cases that do exist
are not consistent. The Board sometimes disagrees about whether un-
fair labor practices exist, upholding as violations allegations the ALJ
had dismissed.54 In other cases, the Board disagrees with the ALJ about
the seriousness of an employer's unfair labor practices and the prac-
tices' likely effect on employee free choice.55 Finally, the Board some-
times disagrees with the ALJ about the union's majority status, usually
by counting as valid, authorization cards that the ALJ had invali-
dated.56 In these cases, the Board typically independently assesses the
effect of the employer's unlawful actions on employees, since the ALJ,
not having found majority status, never reached the issue.
If ALJ determinations influence the courts, enforcement should be
less likely when the ALJ did not recommend a bargaining order. In
these cases she may have found no unfair labor practices or may have
questioned the serious effect of the employer's unlawful activity. Likeli-
hood of enforcement should increase when both the ALJ and the Board
felt that a bargaining order was appropriate and also when the ALJ
did not recommend a bargaining order due to the lack of majority sup-
port for the union. To reflect accurately the effect of an ALJ's negative
decision, this Article used the reasons for the ALJ's recommendations
in constructing this variable.
F. Identity of the Court
Not all courts apply the same standards to bargaining order cases.
Differentiating among the circuits captures circuit-specific effects such
as whether any particular circuits are either tougher or more lenient
than others in the treatment of NLRB-issued bargaining orders. Cir-
cuit courts' opinions in bargaining order cases suggest that the Second
and Seventh Circuits have a much lower enforcement rate than other
circuits. No circuits appeared to be noticeably lenient in the cases stud-
53 See R. GORMAN, supra note 2, at 9.
14 See, e.g., Doug Hartley, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. 800 (1981).
5 See, e.g., Piggly Wiggly, 258 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1981).
56 See, e.g., Zero Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 495, 499-500 (1982).
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ied. Thus, the Second and Seventh Circuits should be less likely than
other circuits to enforce bargaining orders.
This Part has described important factors in considering whether a
court will enforce a bargaining order. The studied cases utilize these
factors in our examination. In the next Part, this Article describes the
process used to integrate these variables into conclusions.
III. DATA COLLECTION
The NLRB issued 176 bargaining orders during fiscal years 1979
through 1982.17 Of that number, the courts of appeals reviewed 108 of
those orders.58 Of the 108 appeals, the bargaining order was not en-
forced in 32 cases. Twenty-seven of the 76 enforced bargaining orders
were enforced by memorandum decisions.5 9 The following information
was collected for the firms and unions involved in the 108 appealed
bargaining order cases: unit size (number of employees in the bargain-
ing unit); NLRB region 60 in which the firm was located; the percentage
of employee support for the union at the time the union demanded rec-
ognition (or filed a petition);61 whether the administrative law judge
recommended a bargaining order (if not, the reason why); the time (in
months) between the date of demand for recognition and the date the
NLRB issued the bargaining order; the time (in months) between when
the NLRB issued the bargaining order and the date of the court of
57 This study period runs from October 1, 1978, through September 30, 1982. Fiscal
years are used rather than calendar years because the NLRB's records and statistics are
maintained according to fiscal years.
58 For a list of these cases, see Appendix B.
59 A memorandum decision usually denotes an unpublished order, the results of
which are merely noted in the Federal Reporter. Sometimes, no official report of the
court's action exists. In those instances, the authors gathered data either from unofficial
case reports (such as the Labor Relations Reference Manual) or from NLRB records
that are available to the general public.
60 The NLRB is a federal administrative agency headquartered in Washington,
D.C. The Board maintains more than 30 regional offices throughout the United States.
These offices are under the supervision of the General Counsel, whb acts as prosecutor
in unfair labor practice cases. The primary activity of the regional offices is the investi-
gation and prosecution of unfair labor practices and the holding of elections in repre-
sentation cases.
61 This variable was measured as the proportion of employees who had signed au-
thorization cards, designating the union as their bargaining representative. For a dis-
cussion of the use of authorization cards as an indication of employee support for a
union, see Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union Representation Election Outcome:
An Empirical Assessment of the Assumptions Underlying the Supreme Court's Gissel
Decision, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 87 (1984).
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appeals decision; the circuit and the outcome of the appellate case; and
any unfair labor practices committed by the employer.
The information on unit size, region, unit strength, administrative
law judge recommendation, time between demand for recognition and
bargaining order date, and unfair labor practices was all collected from
the NLRB cases.62 The remaining information was obtained from the
courts of appeals opinions. Names and definitions of, and descriptive
statistics on, the variables used appear in Table 1.
The variable, ENFORCE, represents the answer "yes" or "no" to
the question whether the court enforced the bargaining order. The
mean of this variable, 0.70, indicates that the courts of appeals enforced





Variable (definition) or Mean Deviation Range
ENFORCE (1=enforced, 0=not enforced) .70 0 or 1
USTRENGTH (% authorization cards signed) 65.53 14.13 46.0-100.0
SIZE (# employees in bargaining unit) 76.57 123.57 2-1000
ALJNO (1 =bargaining order not 0.11 0 or 1
recommended, 0 = recommended)
DEM-ORD (# months between demand for 25.96 10.12 10.5-63.0
rec. and date of bargaining order)
ORD-APP (# months between bargaining 16.48 6.60 6.0-43.0
order and appellate decision)
DEM-APP (# months between demand for 42.44 12.94 23.5-92.0
rec. and appellate decision)
DISCHG (1 =discriminatory discharge, 0.59 0 or I
0 = none)
THRCLS (1 =threat of plant closure, 0=none) 0.47 0 or 1
THRDIS (1 =threat of discharge, 0=none) 0.54 0 or 1
GRNTBEN (1 =grant of benefits, 0=none) 0.44 0 or 1
PROMBEN (1 =promise of benefits, O=none) 0.49 0 or I
CLOSE (1 =plant closure, O=none) 0.03 0 or 1
62 LEXIS (a computer assisted legal research service) and the NLRB's Classified
Index to Decisions were used to identify all bargaining order cases within the study
period.
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The percentage variable, USTRENGTH, is used to indicate em-
ployee union support. The variable represents the number of authori-
zation cards signed by employees in the bargaining unit (at the time of
demand for recognition), divided by the total number of employees in
the bargaining unit (SIZE). This percentage constituted a majority
(i.e., between 50% and 100%) in all except 2 cases. 3 Seven of the 108
observations showed complete (100%) union support. Since Gissel only
requires that the union demonstrate majority support, how the level of
employee support should affect the probability of enforcement is un-
clear. However, this effect should be positive if courts believe that a
union election loss after high initial employee support was the result of
employer coercion rather than simply lack of employee interest.
One important insight stems from a 1984 study by Professor Laura
Cooper in which she examined the use of authorization cards to mea-
sure employee union support. 64 Cooper found that majority employee
support, as measured using authorization cards, does not guarantee a
union victory in an NLRB-conducted election. Instead, she found that
unions with a bare majority of authorization cards were more likely to
lose than to win an election. 65 This conclusion demonstrates that the
percentage of authorization cards signed overstates the level of em-
ployee union support. The average level of union support for cases in
this present Article was 65.53%. This percentage is very close to the
percentage at which Cooper found unions to have a 50-50 chance of
winning an election. 66
In order to examine the effect of unit size on the probability of en-
forcement, the variable, SIZE, measures the number of employees in
the bargaining unit. This number often changed during the time be-
tween the union's demand for recognition and the court of appeals deci-
sion. When this occurred, the unit size at the date of the union's de-
mand was used,67 since the union's majority status is usually measured
63 The two cases in which bargaining orders were issued even though there was
never any indication of majority support for the union are United Dairy Farmers
Coop. Ass'n, 257 N.L.R.B. 772 (1981), and Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1982).
The Board overruled Conair and disclaimed its authority to issue nonmajority bargain-
ing orders in Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578 (1984).
6 See Cooper, supra note 61.
65 Id. at 119.
66 Id. at 137.
67 This measurement of unit size was also used in the denominator of the variable
representing strength of employee support for the union. See infra note 64 and accom-
panying text.
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as of the time of demand.6" Unit sizes ranged from 2 to 1,000, with
76.57 employees as the average size. This number is close to the aver-
age size of bargaining units in all NLRB elections. 69
The variable ALJNO is defined to equal "1" if the administrative
law judge did not recommend a bargaining order (for reasons other
than lack of majority support) and "0" if she did. When a case did not
involve an ALJ (e.g., the Board imposed a bargaining order in a sum-
mary judgment), ALJNO was set equal to "0". This arrangement al-
lows measurement of the effect on the probability of enforcement of a
nonrecommendation by the ALJ. A nonrecommendation should de-
crease the likelihood that courts of appeals will enforce a bargaining
order. One should note from Table 1 that the ALJ recommended bar-
gaining orders in 89% of the cases studied.
The variables, DEM-ORD, ORD-APP, and DEM-APP, represent
the effect of a delay on the probability of enforcement. DEM-ORD is
the number of months (to the nearest one-half month) between the
union's demand for recognition (or, if no demand was made, the filing
of a petition) and the NLRB decision. ORD-APP is the number of
months (to the nearest one-half month) between the date of the NLRB
decision and the court of appeals decision. DEM-APP is the number of
months (to the nearest one-half month) between the union's demand for
recognition and the court of appeals decision. If a long time lag reduces
the probability of a bargaining order's enforcement, then employers
should be eager to appeal the Board's decision to cause further delay.70
As Table 1 demonstrates, several months (or years) can elapse between
a union's demand for recognition and a court of appeals final decision.
The variables DISCHG, THRCLS, THRDIS, GRNTBEN,
PROMBEN, and CLOSE represent hallmark violations. The unfair
labor practices corresponding to these six variables, respectively, are:
68 NLRA § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982) forbids an employer from recog-
nizing a union lacking majority support. In bargaining order cases, the union's strength
at the time it requests recognition (i.e., the demand) is of particular importance. If the
Board subsequently issues a bargaining order and determines that the union, in fact,
had majority status at the time of demand, the bargaining obligation will ordinarily be
retroactive and be made effective as of the demand date. See, e.g., Trading Port, Inc.,
219 N.L.R.B. 298 (1975).
69 In fiscal 1983, for example, the average number of employees per election unit
was 41, compared with 50 in fiscal 1982. About three-fourths of all 1983 elections
involved fewer than 60 employees. 48 NLRB ANN. REP. 15 (1986).
10 The delay inherent in the review process provides employers with an incentive to
appeal bargaining order decisions, even if there is little chance of success. See supra
notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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discriminatory discharge (or layoff), threat of plant closure, threat of
discharge, granting of benefits, promise of benefits, and plant closure.
In some cases, the NLRB or the ALJ or both found that an employer
committed one or more of these hallmark violations, but the court of
appeals disagreed. In those instances, the NLRB's findings were used
since those findings initially prompted the order's issuance. The court
disagreed with the Board's unfair labor practice findings in very few
cases. When the Board and court did disagree, their differing assess-
ment of the employer's motives or the strength of the employer's eco-
nomic justifications was simply a matter of discretion. Although motive
is relevant in cases of discriminatory discharge and plant closings, the
General Counsel does not have to prove motive to establish violations
based on threats.7' The Board's assumption is that hallmark violations
tend to undermine union support. The presence of such employer con-
duct, then, should mean that courts are more likely to enforce a bar-
gaining order.
The most frequently observed hallmark violation was discriminatory
discharge, which 59% of employers committed. This trend may indicate
that employers perceive the discharge of employees for union activity to
be an effective campaign tactic. 72 Threat of discharge is similarly used.
Fifty-four percent of employers committed this hallmark violation. The
least frequently used (and arguably the most drastic) hallmark violation
was plant closure. Only 3 out of the 108 employers closed down, al-
though 47% (51 employers) threatened to close. Finally, about half of
employers promised benefits to employees to discourage union support,
and 44% of employers actually granted benefits to employees for that
purpose.
Table 2 summarizes the appellate courts decisions according to the
circuits in which the appeals were heard. The average enforcement rate
for all circuits was 70.4%. The Table also indicates that the Second and
Seventh Circuits' enforcement rates were significantly lower than the
average. The Second Circuit enforced only 45.5% of the orders it re-
viewed, and the Seventh Circuit denied enforcement in three-quarters
of its bargaining order cases. These figures imply that the Second and
71 J. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS, THE BASIC PROCESSES, LAW
AND PRACTICE 49 (1988).
72 See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1769 (1983). Weiler refers to discriminatory
discharge as "the most powerful weapon in the employer's arsenal." Id. at 1779.
Weiler adds that "the dismissal of key union adherents gives a chilling edge to the
warning that union representation is likely to be more trouble for the employees than it
is worth." Id. at 1778.
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Seventh Circuit cases have a lower probability of enforcement than that
in other circuits, ceteris paribus.
Table 2
Summary of Appellate Court Decisions
Circuit No. of Cases No. Enforced No. Not Enforced
(out of 108) (out of cases in Cir.) (out of cases in Cir.)
1 6 ( 5.6%) 4 (66.7%) 2 (33.3%)
2 11 (10.2%) 5 (45.5%) 6 (54.5%)
3 14 (13.0%) 12 (85.7%) 2 (14.3%)
4 7 ( 6.5%) 4 (57.1%) 3 (42.9%)
5 3 ( 2.8%) 3 (100%) 0 (0.0%)
6 19 (17.6%) 15 (78.9%) 4 (21.1%)
7 8 ( 7.4%) 2 (25.0%) 6 (75.0%)
8 13 (12.0%) 11 (84.6%) 2 (15.4%)
9 15 (13.9%) 11 (73.3%) 4 (26.7%)
10 2 (1.9%) 2 (100%) 0 (0.0%)
11 3 ( 2.8%) 2 (66.7%) 1 (33.3%)
DC 7 ( 6.5%) 5 (71.4%) 2 (28.6%)
Totals: 108 (100%) 76 (70.4%) 32 (29.6%)
IV. FINDINGS
This Part discusses how the factors mentioned in Part III affected
the courts of appeals decisions in bargaining order cases. The results
appear in accompanying tables and graphs. In addition, this Part esti-
mates a probit regression model"3 to examine and to test hypotheses
about the individual impacts the factors had on the probability that a
bargaining order would be enforced by a court of appeals.
A. Changed Circumstances
As previously mentioned, some courts of appeals invoke the changed
circumstances doctrine to justify nonenforcement of bargaining orders.
Specifically, courts observe actual or surmised changes in employee
composition of the bargaining unit, turnover in management personnel,
business reorganization, and other factors affecting the structure or con-
stitution of the bargaining unit. All of these factors are more likely to
occur as time passes from the date unfair labor practices occur or the
date on which the bargaining order issues to the date of the appellate




To examine the influence of this doctrine in bargaining order cases,
the length of time between a union's demand for recognition and the
court of appeals decision was compared in each circuit against cases
that were and cases that were not enforced. The same comparisons
were made using the time lag between the NLRB's issuance of bar-
gaining orders and the court of appeals decisions. Figures 1 and 2 (on
the next page) indicate that these time lags were not significantly dif-
ferent between enforced and nonenforced cases.74 Thus, courts appear
no more likely to deny enforcement of bargaining orders in cases of
significant time lag than in cases of expeditious resolution. Given the
relationship between delay and the factors most often mentioned when
invoking the changed circumstances doctrine, this finding suggests that
the doctrine may not be as significant as the courts' opinions claim.
This implication is particularly striking in the Second and Seventh
Circuits, which enforce bargaining orders less often than any other cir-
cuits. Both circuits frequently refer to changed circumstances to justify
their nonenforcement. Based on the study's results, however, one ques-
tions whether changed circumstances really motivated these decisions.
This Article's findings indicate that the time lapse, measured two dif-
ferent ways, does not present a reliable method to predict whether the
Second and Seventh Circuits will enforce a bargaining order. In the
Second Circuit, for example, 4 of the 6 unenforced cases had shorter
time lags from bargaining order to appeals court decision than enforced
cases. In addition, 1 of the 6 unenforced bargaining orders involved a
shorter total time lag (from demand for recognition to court of appeals
decision) than in the enforced cases. The data are even more revealing
for the Seventh Circuit. In that circuit, 5 of the 6 unenforced cases had
shorter time lags from order to court decision than the enforced cases.
Additionally, 3 of the 6 unenforced cases had shorter time lags from
demand to court decision than the enforced cases.
Even if time lag does not influence judicial decisions, delays inherent
in the review process still furnish employers some advantages and pro-
vide some incentive to seek review, regardless of the merits of a case.
Besides simply delaying the bargaining obligation, evidence suggests
that delay also causes a more significant effect. In some appealed cases,
a substantial number of union supporters left the workforce during the
delay between the order and judicial enforcement. At the time of the
74 The Fifth and Tenth Circuits enforced all of their bargaining orders in the sam-
ple, so no comparison can be made for these circuits.
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court's order, then, the bargaining unit is comprised of many employees
who were not working for the employer at the time of the union's or-
ganizing campaign. This fact affects employee support for the union
when the court finally enforces the Board's order and the obligation to
bargain becomes binding. Some unions claim that they abandoned the
bargaining relationship because of this diminution in employee sup-
port.7" Thus, even though the passage of time does not affect the chance
for enforcement, it may reduce the union's chances of successful negoti-
ations with an employer. This factor could influence an employer's de-
cision to seek review, thereby gaining an advantage through additional
delay.
B. Size of Unit
To determine if bargaining unit size influences enforcement deci-
sions, the bargaining units in the sample were divided by size into four
groups. The proportion of cases in which the NLRB issued bargaining
orders was then determined for each size category. The first two col-
umns of Table 3 present these figures. The next two columns show the
proportion of cases courts of appeals reviewed for each size category.
The similarity of these proportions to the numbers of cases in each
category indicates that bargaining unit size does not seem to influence a
decision by the parties to seek judicial review. The last two columns of
Table 3 detail the proportion of cases in which courts enforced the bar-
gaining order. As these columns indicate, the distribution of cases
among the size categories still does not significantly change. Thus, the
proportion of cases in which courts enforced the order in each size cate-
gory is roughly parallel to the proportion of cases selected for review.
This finding suggests that courts of appeals do not consider the size of
the bargaining unit alone to be a significant factor in bargaining order
cases.
15 This evidence is based on preliminary data collected for a project which examines
bargaining order unions and compares them to unions that were elected during the
same time period. Many of the bargaining order unions have abandoned their bargain-
ing relationship with the employer. The unions often cite lack of employee support that
stems from substantial employee turnover as the reason prompting their action. See
results on file with U.C. Davis Law Review.
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Table 3
Effect of Unit Size
Size of Bargaining Orders Appealed Enforced
Bargaining Unit N % N % N %
2-9 28 16.2% 14 13.1% 11 14.5%
10-19 40 23.1% 21 19.4% 16 21.1%
20-99 75 43.4% 48 44.4% 33 43.4%
100+ 30 17.3% 25 23.1% 16 21.1%
TOTALS 173 100% 108 100% 76 100%
One should not infer from these data, however, that unit size has no
influence over judicial decisionmaking. As noted earlier, certain unfair
labor practices may have more impact in small units than in large ones.
This statement warrants two considerations. First, are the severity of
the unfair labor practices and unit size at all related? For instance, if
an employer's campaign was replete with unfair labor practices, is a
court more likely to grant enforcement when the bargaining unit is
small than when it is large? Second, do courts believe that certain kinds
of unfair labor practices have more impact on smaller units?
As Part II observed, measuring the overall severity of a particular
unlawful campaign is not easy. However, identifying the existence of
hallmark violations and the variety that occur in each case is possible.
While this measure of severity is admittedly imperfect, it furnishes at
least some index of the overall seriousness of infractions.
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Table 4
Size vs. Number of Different Hallmark Violations Committed
Number (out of 6) of Different Hallmark Violations Committed
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
SIZE
(# cases) N %enf N %enf N %enf N %enf N %enf N %enf N %enf
2- 9 0-- 7 86% 5 80% 2 50% 0 -- 0-- 0--
(14)
10-19 0-- 3 67% 6 67% 8 75% 3 100% 1 100% 0--
(21)
20 - 39 0-- 6 83% 6 83% 7 86% 2 100% 2 50% 1 100%
(24)
40-99 1 0% 2 50% 10 50% 6 50% 3 100% 2 100% 0 --
(24)
100+ 1 0% 2100% 7 57% 6 50% 7 71% 2100% 0 --
(25)
All
Cases 2 0% 20 75% 34 65% 29 66% 15 87% 7 86% 1 100%
(108) 1 1
Table 4 reports the results of this survey of cases. That Table counts
the different types of hallmark violations, ranging from 0 to 6, commit-
ted in each case. On average, employers committed between 2 and 3
types of hallmark violations, with the modal (most frequently observed)
number being 2, a phenomenon observed in 34 cases. The distribution
of these numbers for all cases is recorded in the bottom row of Table 4.
Only 2 cases included no hallmark violations (but did include other
employer unfair labor practices), and the court did not enforce the bar-
gaining order in either case. The court enforced the order in the only
case that included all 6 hallmark violations.
Although one might speculate that employees in smaller bargaining
units should be more susceptible to employer coercion, and that the
likelihood of enforcement should increase in proportion to the severity
of a campaign, the data in Table 4 do not support this assumption.
Courts generally enforced bargaining orders in cases with 4 or more
varieties of hallmark violations, regardless of the bargaining unit's size.
In addition, bargaining unit size was not a factor in cases with 3 or
fewer hallmark violations. The enforcement rate was somewhat higher
for units with 10-19 employees and for units with 20-39 employees.
Nevertheless, the enforcement rate was almost the same for very small
units (2-9 employees) and large units (40-99 and over 100 employees).
While one cannot conclude that severity and size are unrelated, it is at
least clear that the cases studied revealed no consistent enforcement
pattern.
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The same conclusion does not apply, however, when the effect that
specific unfair labor practices have on enforcement is observed by unit
size. Table 5 reports the results of this observation, with specific hall-
mark violations identified and the results of court enforcement decisions
recorded by unit size. The numbers of cases reported in the Table do
not sum to the number of cases in each size category because Table 5's
columns are not mutually exclusive. Thus, a single case can include
more than one hallmark violation and be included in more than one
category. The bottom row shows the overall results of all cases and
merely restates Table 7.
Table 5
Size vs. Types of Hallmark Violations Committed
Hallmark Violations
Discrim. Threat of Threat of Grant of Prom. of Plant
Discharge Closure Discharge Benefits Benefits Closure
SIZE
(# cases) N %enf N %enf N %enf N %enf N %enf N %enf
2-9 11 73% 3 100% 2 50% 3 100% 4 50% 0 --
(14)
10- 19 17 76% 6 100% 12 83% 9 78% 12 75% 0 --
(21)
20 - 39 11 82% 12 92% 15 67% 11 82% 12 83% 2 100%
(24)
40 - 99 11 82% 14 64% 11 73% 13 54% 12 67% 1 100%
(24)
100+ 14 64% 16 69% 18 67% 11 73% 13 69% 0 --
(25)
All
Cases 64 75% 51 78% 58 71% 47 72% 53 72% 3 100%
(108) 11 1 1 1
To test the correlation, if any, between bargaining unit size and spe-
cific unfair labor practices, one should consider each column in Table 5
separately. If the enforcement rate for cases which include a particular
violation tends to be higher for small bargaining units, this tendency
would indicate that courts consider the hallmark violation in that col-
umn to have a larger impact in small bargaining units. At the very least
the tendency indicates that courts are more likely to enforce a bargain-
ing order when a particular unfair labor practice occurs in small bar-
gaining units than when the same violation occurs in larger units. The
most striking evidence of this pattern is seen in the second column, cor-
responding to the hallmark violation of threat of plant closure. When
that violation was present the courts enforced all but 1 of the 21 cases
NLRB Bargaining Orders
in the three smallest unit size categories (i.e., 2-9 employees, 10-19 em-
ployees, and 20-39 employees). The enforcement rate is much lower,
however, for cases in which the same hallmark violation occurred in
larger units.
These raw data cannot accurately predict judicial action in every
case. Nevertheless, courts could perceive a threat of plant closure to
have a more coercive impact in small bargaining units. The courts may
therefore be more likely to enforce NLRB bargaining orders based on
these threats. Conversely, courts are less deferential as the bargaining
unit size increases.
This trend can also be observed in grant of benefits cases in which,
again, enforcement is more likely in small units than in large ones.
Interestingly, unit size does not influence cases containing either dis-
criminatory discharge, thought by some to be the most egregious em-
ployer unfair labor practice, or the threat of discharge. One might spec-
ulate that these actions should produce more anxiety in small units
than in large ones and, therefore, be deemed a more serious violation
warranting a more extraordinary remedy. Although the lowest enforce-
ment rate for discriminatory discharge occurred in the largest units
(over 100 employees), courts demonstrated no consistent size-related
pattern for either discharge or threat of discharge. Thus, while courts
generally defer to Board decisions in discriminatory discharge cases,
unit size plays little or no role in the decision to enforce. Some unac-
counted for factor, such as a discharged employee's identity or her sta-
tus within the union, may be influential. If some unaccounted for factor
is the cause, size of the unit could also be a factor. However, this con-
clusion cannot be drawn from the assembled data.
C. Union Strength
The interpretation of Table 6 is analogous to Table 3's, except that
Table 6 considers strength of employee union support instead of unit
size. As previously stated, the union had majority support in all but 2
of the study period cases. Since current Board doctrine precludes a
nonmajority union from obtaining a bargaining order, those 2 cases
were not included in Table 6.
1988]
University of California, Davis
Table 6
Effect of Employee Support for the Union
% Authorization Bargaining Orders Appealed Enforced
Cards Signed (USTR) N % N % N %
50 < USTR < 60 74 43.0% 52 48.6% 33 43.4%
60 < USTR < 70 41 23.8% 24 22.4% 20 26.3%
70 < USTR < 80 30 17.4% 14 13.1% 10 13.2%
80 < USTR < 90 12 7.0% 8 7.5% 5 6.6%
90 < USTR < 100 15 8.8% 9 8.4% 8 10.5%
TOTALS 172 100% 107 100% 76 100%
Columns 1 and 2 indicate the level of employee union support in the
cases studied, including both absolute numbers and the proportion to
the entire group. Columns 3 and 4 indicate the proportion by level of
employee support of cases for which review was sought. The only sig-
nificant finding is a slightly higher incidence of parties seeking review
for cases in which support for the union was relatively low. This find-
ing could relate to bargaining unit turnover discussed in Part II. Since
unions sometimes abandon a bargaining relationship because of high
turnover (and the resulting lack of support) even after obtaining en-
forcement, employers who initially know that a union has weak sup-
port might be more willing to request review. These employers thereby
gain the advantages of additional delay.
Columns 5 and 6 depict the results of court review. These results
indicate that appellate courts tend to enforce cases with high employee
union support more readily than cases with less employee support. For
example, courts enforced bargaining orders in only about 60% of 52
cases in which employee support was between 50% and 60%. On the
other hand, courts enforced the orders in all but 1 case in which em-
ployee support was between 90% and 100%. Thus, stronger employee
union support increases the probability that courts will enforce bar-
gaining orders.
Why the level of employee union support should increase a court's
willingness to enforce a bargaining order is not clear. Gissel requires
only that the union demonstrate majority support. The critical inquiry
is not the level of support (assuming it is at least a majority), but rather
the effect of the employer's unlawful conduct. A court may, however, be
more willing to defer to Board assumptions about the effect of an em-
ployer's coercive actions when the union has had substantial support.
Thus, a court might be more willing to accept the Board's conclusion
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that a union's election loss was caused by coercion (rather than merely
a loss of interest) when the union previously had garnered significant
employee support.
D. Hallmark Violations
Table 7 compares the overall enforcement rate of the study period
cases with the enforcement rates for cases in which each of the hall-
mark violations occurred. For example, discriminatory discharge was
present in 64 of the cases. Of these 64 cases, the courts enforced 48,
representing an enforcement rate of 75%. This rate is higher than the
overall percentage for enforced cases of 70.4%. Similarly, courts en-
forced orders in 78.8% of cases in which the employer threatened to
close. This figure is, again, a higher enforcement rate than the overall
rate.
Cases involving threats of discharge, grants of benefits, and promises
of benefits all display enforcement rates very close to or equal to the
overall enforcement rate. This finding suggests that none of these three
hallmark violations significantly affects the probability that courts of
appeals will enforce a bargaining order. The results for the final hall-
mark violation, the actual closing of a plant, must be considered with
caution. Because of the small sample size, drawing inferences on the
basis of these cases would be improper. Specifically, employers closed
down in only three of the cases. Interestingly, in all three of these cases,
courts enforced the bargaining order. Although one may assume, as the
Board does, that plant closure has a deleterious effect on employee
rights, not much is gained by imposing an order to bargain on an em-
ployer that is already out of business.76
76 Such orders are not entirely useless. It is clear, for example, that employers must
bargain with unions that represent their employees about the effect on the employees of
the business' closure. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666
(1981). Presumably, however, a union would have little leverage to extract concessions
(such as severance pay) from an employer who had already ceased operations.
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Table 7
Effect of Hallmark Violations
Hallmark Enforced Not Enforced
Violation N % N %
Discriminatory
Discharge 47 74.6% 16 25.4%
Threat of
Closure 41 78.8% 11 21.2%
Threat of
Discharge 41 70.7% 17 29.3%
Grant of
Benefits 34 70.8% 14 29.2%
Promise of
Benefits 38 70.4% 16 29.6%
Plant
Closure 3 100.0% 0 0.0%
It is not surprising that the most consequential hallmark violations
are discriminatory discharge and threat of plant closure. The Board
often asserts that these unfair labor practices go to the heart of the Act.
The findings, however, do not necessarily mean that courts defer to
NLRB decisions concerning the effect of unfair labor practices. Thus,
while Table 7's results support the inference that courts defer to
NLRB discretion, the results may also mean that courts have indepen-
dently judged the effect of the employer's actions and have merely
agreed with Board conclusions.
E. Probit Model
In addition to the foregoing analysis of raw data, the Authors esti-
mated a probit model to obtain numerical measures of the effects of
various factors on the probability of enforcement. Appendix A contains
a detailed report of these estimation results. This report contains im-
portant findings, with some especially noteworthy.
In general, the probit regression results confirm the observations
made earlier in this Part. Stronger employee union support increases
the probability of enforcement by a small but statistically significant
amount. The different time lags involved in the various cases did not
facilitate predicting the probability of enforcement. This conclusion
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confirms the earlier observation that the changed circumstances doctrine
appears to be applied inconsistently to bargaining order cases. The fail-
ure of the administrative law judge to recommend a bargaining order
was also insignificant in predicting the probability of enforcement. This
Article had speculated that this failure might reduce the probability of
enforcement.
The most significant hallmark violations were the threat of closure,
discriminatory discharge, and the granting of benefits, all of which in-
crease the likelihood of enforcement. Threat of closure raises the
probability of enforcement by an estimated 0.2465. In other words,
courts are nearly 25% more likely to enforce bargaining orders for cases
in which the employer threatened to close the plant than for similar
cases in which no such threat occurred. The presence of discriminatory
discharge increases the likelihood of enforcement by 0.1706, and the
granting of benefits raises the probability of enforcement by 0.1573.
The remaining hallmark violations, threat of discharge, promise of ben-
efits, and plant closure did not have a significant effect on the
probability of enforcement.
Not surprisingly, the most significant predictors of the probability for
enforcement are whether the Second or Seventh Circuits decided the
case. These two predictors impact more than any of the other signifi-
cant factors, and they are also the most statistically significant. The
probit model results show that cases reviewed by the Second Circuit
have a 0.4042 lower probability of enforcement than similar cases re-
viewed by other circuits. Cases heard by the Seventh Circuit have a
0.5022 lower probability of enforcement. These factors imply that a
case having a high (close to 1.0) probability of enforcement by another
circuit has only about a 0.60 chance of being enforced by the Second
Circuit, and only a 0.50 chance of being enforced by the Seventh Cir-
cuit. Given the much lower enforcement rates of these two circuits as
noted in Table 2, this result was expected.
CONCLUSION
Courts often complain that they are unable to enforce NLRB reme-
dial bargaining orders because of the Board's failure to explain ade-
quately the reasons for its action. That assertion is accurate in some
cases. Given the NLRA's endorsement of majoritarian principles, the
Board has the burden of explaining why an employer must bargain
with a union despite the lack of an election or of the employer's having
won an election. Nevertheless, the Board's efforts at elucidation do not
explain all cases. Nor should one expect judicial enforcement decisions
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to be influenced only by the quality of the NLRB's writing. Bargaining
orders are extraordinary remedies that have provoked controversy even
within the Board. Courts, then, should be influenced not only by the
form of the Board's decision, but also by the substance that motivated
it.
One must not exaggerate this project's findings. Predicting accurately
whether a court will enforce a bargaining order in a given case is cer-
tainly not possible. However, one can estimate the probability that a
particular circuit will enforce a case with certain measurable character-
istics. That information should prove useful to both union and em-
ployer attorneys (and NLRB lawyers) contemplating appellate review
in bargaining order cases.
For example, some courts are much more likely to deny enforcement
of bargaining orders than others. In addition, the changed circum-
stances doctrine is of dubious importance in courts' decisions, despite
their repeated references to it. Since the changed circumstances doctrine
does not appear to affect appellate decisions, and because the suffi-
ciency of the Board's explanation as a factor is uncertain, one legiti-
mately questions what factors do influence judicial decision making in
bargaining order cases. While definite answers are unclear, some fac-
tors can be identified as influential.
As observed in Part I, any student of judicial opinions could discern
that some courts have little respect for the NLRB's presumed expertise
and are willing to substitute their judgment for the Board's, as to both
the likely effect of employer unfair labor practices and the remedies
needed to correct them. One can draw the same inference from this
study's empirical data.
This Article's findings indicate that courts are more likely to enforce
bargaining orders when certain unfair labor practices are committed
against small bargaining units. Other data indicate that, in making en-
forcement decisions, courts are influenced by the size of the union's ma-
jority. Finally, bargaining orders are more likely to be enforced if
premised on discriminatory discharge or threat of closure than if im-
posed to remedy other types of unfair labor practices.
These findings are consistent with the conclusion that, rather than
deferring to the Board, courts are making their own assessment of the
impact of employer conduct. Integral parts of this assessment include
the type of violation, the size of the unit, and the union's strength. This
conclusion is also buttressed by data indicating that courts are not in-
fluenced by the presence of hallmark violations other than discrimina-
tory discharge and threat of closure. Thus, even though the Board re-
gards other hallmark violations as highly significant, their presence in a
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case is not that significant to courts. To the contrary, the courts seem
content to make their own estimation of the coercive impact of the em-
ployer's unfair labor practices. This mode of review is inconsistent with
the standard of review established by the Supreme Court, which assigns
to the NLRB the primary responsibility for choosing a remedy to effec-
tuate the NLRA's policy.
This Article questions, then, whether the courts provide the proper
measure of respect for and deference to NLRB decisions to impose bar-
gaining orders. Courts might question whether the Board's assumptions
about either the effect of unlawful conduct or the measures necessary to
remedy it, are accurate. However, one must also ask whether similar
assumptions made by a court, based solely on its review of an appellate
record, are of any greater value.
Finally, this Article addresses the efficacy of the Gissel order itself.
The Court premises Gissel orders on the supposedly informed judg-
ment of the NLRB (and, apparently, the courts of appeals) about the
impact of wrongful employer conduct. Since the work product of this
activity may endanger the Act's majoritarian principles, one must ques-
tion not only the validity of assumptions (as Getman, Goldberg and
Herman have done), but also whether the remedy itself is having the
desired effect. Do cases chosen for Gissel orders lead to productive col-
lective bargaining relationships? Are the employees whose rights have
been threatened adequately protected by the imposition of a bargaining
agent? Does judicial enforcement enhance the union's chance for suc-
cess in bargaining, or are the courts' standards so demanding that, iron-
ically, they enforce bargaining orders only in cases so egregious that
any chance of meaningful bargaining has been destroyed. At the pres-
ent time, no one has sought to answer these questions. They will be
addressed in the next phase of the study.
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APPENDIX A - PROBIT MODEL
The Authors estimated a probit model as a more systematic means of
examining the individual effects of factors that influence courts in re-
viewing bargaining orders. The results of this estimation allow us to
assess the impact of certain factors as well as their significance on the
probability of enforcement.
In general, the results of the probit regression confirm observations
made from informal analysis of the data. Table A summarizes the re-
sults of this estimation. The response variable is the probability (rang-
ing from 0 to 1) that a court of appeals will enforce a bargaining order.
The numbers reported in Table A indicate the impact of each of the
predictors listed on the probability that a bargaining order will be en-
forced, when all other predictors are held constant.1 Thus, for example,
the value of 0.1706 corresponding to discriminatory discharge indicates
that cases which include discriminatory discharge as one of the unfair
labor practices have a 0.17 higher probability of being enforced than
similar cases in which no discriminatory discharge occurred. Negative
numbers imply that the corresponding predictor lowers the probability
of enforcement. Table A's significance levels imply statistical signifi-
cance of the estimated effects, with smaller significance levels (0.01 for
example) indicating stronger evidence that the predictor truly affects
the response variable.
Table A does not contain the size (number of employees) of the bar-
gaining units. When size was included as a predictor, it had little or no
effect on the probability of enforcement. Furthermore, the inclusion of
this factor along with strength of employee support for a union (per-
centage of signed authorization cards) adversely affected the predictive
ability of the equation because of the strong correlation between these
two factors. 2
Employee support for the union had a small, but significant, positive
effect on the probability of enforcement. The value of 0.0085 in Table
A indicates that a 1% increase in signed authorization cards increases
' For a thorough, easy-to-follow explanation of the interpretation of probit estima-
tion results, see Becker & Waldman, The Probit Model, in ECONOMETRIC MODELING
IN ECONOMIC EDUCATION RESEARCH 135-40 (1987).
2 The number of employees in a bargaining unit and the percentage of authorization
cards signed have a strong inverse relationship, with smaller bargaining units tending
to have a larger percentage of signed authorization cards than larger units. All of the
units having 100% employee support ranged in size from 2 to 7 employees. This corre-




the probability of enforcement by .0085, or, equivalently, a 10% in-
crease in authorization cards signed leads to a 0.085 (8.5%) increase in
the probability of enforcement. Again, this is the effect of stronger em-
ployee support for the union, holding all other factors fixed. These
findings agree with the analysis of the figures in Table 6.
In order to estimate the effect of the changed circumstances doctrine,
the authors used the length of time between the union's demand for
recognition and the court of appeal's decision to predict the probability
of enforcement. Confirming the prior analysis of Figure l's data, the
length of this time lag was not a significant predictor of the probability
of enforcement. The same was true when we used the time lag as mea-
sured in Figure 2 (time between the NLRB's order and the court of
appeals decision).
The failure of the administrative law judge to recommend a bargain-
ing order was also found to be insignificant in predicting the
probability of enforcement. Around 11% of the cases in the study period
fall into this category. Typically, these decisions were cases in which
the unfair labor practices were not particularly egregious. As noted ear-
lier, the courts speculatively would be less likely to enforce bargaining
orders in these cases because they would be influenced by the ALJ's
conclusion that, after seeing the witnesses and weighing the evidence,
the employer's conduct had not precluded the possibility of a fair elec-
tion. Although it is not clear why the ALJ's failure to recommend a
bargaining order has no significance to the courts of appeals, the failure
may indicate that the courts are simply not impressed by administrative
agency determinations at that level.
The most significant hallmark violations were found to be the threat
of closure, discriminatory discharge, and grant of benefits, all of which
increase the likelihood of enforcement. Threat of closure raises the
probability of enforcement by an estimated 0.2465. In other words,
cases in which the employer threatened to close the plant are approxi-
mately 25% more likely to be enforced than similar cases in which no
such threat occurred. As mentioned above, the presence of discrimina-
tory discharge increases the likelihood of enforcement by 0.1706, and
the grant of benefits raises the probability of enforcement by 0.1573.
The remaining hallmark violations, threat of discharge, promise of ben-
efits, and plant closure were found not to have a significant effect on
the probability of enforcement.
Not surprisingly, the most significant predictors on the probability of
enforcement are having the cases decided by the Second and Seventh
Circuits. These two predictors have the largest impact of all other sig-
nificant factors, and they are also the most statistically significant. The
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results in Table A show that cases reviewed by the Second Circuit have
a 0.4042 lower probability of enforcement than similar cases reviewed
by other circuits. Seventh Circuit cases have a 0.5022 lower probability
of enforcement. This implies that a case that has a high probability
(close to one) of enforcement by another circuit has only about a 0.60
chance of being enforced by the Second Circuit, and only a 50-50
chance of being enforced by the Seventh Circuit. This finding was ex-
pected, given the much lower enforcement rates of these two circuits as
noted in Table 2.
Table A
Probit Regression Results





Bargaining Order by ALJ
Length of Time Between
Demand for Recognition and
Court of Appeals Decision
Discriminatory Discharge





Case Heard in Second
Circuit













* - significant at 10% level
** - significant at 5% level
* significant at 1% level
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APPENDIX B - OFFICIAL CASE CITATIONS FOR APPELLATE
DECISIONS
Advanced Mining Group, 260 N.L.R.B. 486 (1982), enforced, No. 82-
1434 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 28, 1983).
Agricom Oilseeds, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 616 (1979), enforced, No. 80-
7026 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1981).
Ahrens Aircraft, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 839 (1981), affd, 703 F.2d 23
(1st Cir. 1983).
Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 341 (1982), affd, 717 F.2d
141 (4th Cir. 1983).
Alumbaugh Coal Corp., 247 N.L.R.B. 895, modified, 635 F.2d 1380
(8th Cir. 1980).
Amber Delivery Serv., Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 63 (1980), modified, 651
F.2d 57 (1st Cir. 1981).
American Chain Link Fence Co., 255 N.L.R.B. 692 (1981), modified,
670 F.2d 1236 (1st Cir. 1982).
Arrow Molded Plastics, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1979), modified, 653
F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1981).
Artra Group, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 4 (1982), enforced, No. 82-1727
(10th Cir. March 15, 1984).
Axton Candy & Tobacco Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 1034 (1979), modified,
645 F.2d 555 (6th Cir. 1981).
Berger Transfer & Storage, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 5 (1980), affd, 678
F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1982).
Brooks Cameras, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 820 (1980), modified, 691 F.2d
912 (9th Cir. 1982).
Burlington Indus., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 712 (1981), modified, 680 F.2d
974 (4th Cir. 1982).
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Cas Walker's Cash Stores, 249 N.L.R.B. 316 (1980), affd, 659 F.2d
79 (6th Cir. 1981).
Century Moving & Storage, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 671 (1980), modified,
683 F.2d 1087 (7th Cir. 1982).
Chester Valley, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1435 (1980), modified, 652 F.2d
263 (2d Cir. 1981).
Circo Resorts, Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 880 (1979), modified, 646 F.2d 403
(9th Cir. 1981).
Coating Products, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1271 (1980), affd, 648 F.2d 108
(2d Cir. 1981).
Coil-ACC, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 76 (1982), affd, 712 F.2d 1074 (6th
Cir. 1983).
Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1982), modified, 721 F.2d 1355
(D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1241 (1983).
Curlee Clothing Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 355, aff d, 607 F.2d 1213 (8th Cir.
1979).
Dadco Fashions, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1193 (1979), affd, 632 F.2d 493
(5th Cir. 1980).
Davis, 243 N.L.R.B. 837 (1979), affd, 642 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1981).
DeQueen Gen. Hosp., 264 N.L.R.B. 480 (1982), enforced, No. 82-
2247 (8th Cir. Sept. 18, 1984).
Digital Paging Sys. of Toledo, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 127 (1980), affd,
659 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1981).
Discotron Equip., Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 123 (1980), enforced, No. 81-
4043 (2d Cir. Oct. 9, 1981).
Doug Hartley, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. 800 (1981), enforcement denied,
669 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1982).
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Eastern Steel Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 1230 (1981), affd, 671 F.2d 104 (3d
Cir. 1982).
Ed Chandler Ford, Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 851 (1981), enforcement
granted in part, denied in part, No. 82-7351 (9th Cir. May 10,
1983).
Edward A. Utlaut Found., Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1980), enforced
in part, denied in part, 657 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1981).
Ely's Foods, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 909 (1980), affd, 656 F.2d 290 (8th
Cir. 1981).
English Bros. Pattern & Foundry, 253 N.L.R.B. 530 (1980), affd, 679
F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1982).
The Exchange Bank, 264 N.L.R.B. 822 (1982), affd, 732 F.2d 60
(6th Cir. 1984).
Faith Garment Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 299 (1979), affd, 630 F.2d 630
(8th Cir. 1980).
Frederick's Foodland, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 284 (1980), modified, 655
F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1981).
G.E.S., Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 300 (1981), affd, 697 F.2d 157 (6th Cir.
1983).
Garry Mfg. Co., 242 N.L.R.B. 539 (1979), modified, 630 F.2d 934 (3d
Cir. 1980).
Gordonsville Indus., Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 563 (1980), affd, Nos. 80-
2203, 80-2392, 80-2576 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 1982).
Greyhound Food Mgmt., Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 1293 (1981), enforced,
No. 81-1779 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1983).
Hasbro Indus., Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 587 (1981), modified, 672 F.2d 978
(1st Cir. 1982).
Heads & Threads Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 800 (1982), modified, 724 F.2d
282 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Hitchiner Mfg. Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 927 (1979), affd, 634 F.2d 1110
(8th Cir. 1980).
Industry Prods. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1380 (1980), affd, 673 F.2d 164
(6th Cir. 1982).
J.J. Newberry Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 991 (1980), modified, 645 F.2d 148
(2d Cir. 1981).
J.P. Stevens & Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 407 (1979), affid, 668 F.2d 767 (4th
Cir. 1980), vacated, 458 U.S. 1118 (1981).
Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 240 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1979), enforced, No. 80-
1059 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 1980).
Jim Baker Trucking Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 121 (1979), enforced, No. 79-
7163 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 1980).
John Cuneo, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1981), affd, 681 F.2d 11 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
Justak Bros. & Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 1054, affd, 664 F.2d 1074 (7th
Cir. 1981).
K & K Gourmet Meats, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 1331 (1979), modified,
640 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1981).
Keystone Pretzel Bakery, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 492 (1979), affd, 696
F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1982).
Knogo Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1346 (1982), modified, 727 F.2d 55 (2d
Cir. 1984).
La Mousse, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 37 (1981), enforced, No. 82-7198 (9th
Cir. Feb. 12, 1983).
Local 19, Hotel, Motel, etc. Employees Union, 240 N.L.R.B. 240
(1979), enforcement denied, No. 80---- (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 1980)
(unreported decision; result supplied by NLRB).
Lockwoven Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1979), affd, 622 F.2d 296 (8th
Cir. 1980).
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Loy Food Stores, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 305 (1981), modified, 697 F.2d
798 (7th Cir. 1983).
Magnesium Castings Co., 250 N.L.R.B. 692 (1980), affd, 668 F.2d
13 (1st Cir. 1981).
Maidsville Goal Co., 257 N.L.R.B. 1106 (1981), enforced, 718 F.2d
658 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984).
Maietta Contracting, 251 N.L.R.B. 177 (1980), enforced, No. 6-CA-
1260 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 1981).
Marcus J. Lawrence Memorial Hosp., 249 N.L.R.B. 608 (1980), en-
forced in part, denied in part, No. 80-7363 (9th Cir. June 11,
1981).
Marion Rohr Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 971 (1982), modified, 714 F.2d 228
(2d Cir. 1983).
Martin-Brower Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 194 (1982), enforced, No. 82-2051
(D.C. Cir. May 10, 1983).
Massey Stores, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1979), modified, 631 F.2d
328 (4th Cir. 1980).
Medical Investors Ass'n, 260 N.L.R.B. 941 (1982), enforced, No. 82-
4178 (2d Cir. Feb 2, 1983).
Modern Mfg. Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 534 (1982), enforced, No. 83-1018
(4th Cir. Nov. 22, 1983).
Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 196 (1980), enforcement de-
nied, 668 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1981), affd, 267 N.L.R.B. 900
(1983).
Motor Inn of Perrysburg, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 280 (1979), modified,
647 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1981).
Naum Bros., 240 N.L.R.B. 311 (1979), affd, 637 F.2d 589 (6th Cir.
1981).
University of California, Davis
Onan, A Div. of Ona Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1378 (1982), enforcement
granted in part, denied in part, and remanded, 729 F.2d 713
(11th Cir. 1984).
Pace Oldsmobile, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 1001 (1981), modified on re-
mand, 739 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982).
Patsy Bee, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 976 (1980), enforcement denied, 654
F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1981), modified, 266 N.L.R.B. 635 (1983).
Pay 'N Save Corp., 247 N.L.R.B. 1346 (1980), affd, 641 F.2d 697
(9th Cir. 1981).
Pedro's, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 567 (1979), modified, 652 F.2d 1005
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
Penn Color, Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. 395 (1982), enforced, No. 82-3430 (3d
Cir. June 2, 1983).
Permanent Label Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 118 (1980), affd, 657 F.2d 512
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1981).
Piggly Wiggly, 258 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1981), affd, 705 F.2d 1537 (11th
Cir. 1983).
Pilgrim Life Ins. Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 1228 (1980), enforced, No. 80-
2085 (8th Cir. May 21, 1981).
Precision Graphics, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 381 (1981), enforced, No. 81-
1734 (3d Cir. April 29, 1982).
Price's Pic-Pac Supermarkets, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 742 (1981), affd,
707 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1983).
Progressive Supermarkets, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 512 (1981), granting pe-
tition to review, No. 82-3088 (3d Cir. Oct. 20, 1982).
RAI Research Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. 918 (1981), enforced, Nos. 81-
4184, 81-4214 (2d Cir. March 8, 1982).
Rapid Mfg. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 465 (1978), modified, 612 F.2d 144 (3d
Cir. 1979).
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Red Oaks Nursing Home, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 444 (1979), modified,
633 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1980).
Rexair, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 876 (1979), modified, 646 F.2d 249 (6th
Cir. 1981).
Robin Am. Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. 822 (1979), modified, 654 F.2d 1022
(5th Cir. Unit B Aug. 1981), modified, 667 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir.
1982).
Roth's IGA Foodliner, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 132 (1981), enforced, No.
81-7871 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 1982).
SMC Restaurant Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 313 (1982), enforced, No. 82-
4129, (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 1983).
Southern Moldings, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. 839 (1981), affd, 715 F.2d
1069, vacated, 719 F.2d 858 (6th Cir. 1983), affd, 728 F.2d 805
(6th Cir. 1984).
Spiegel, 257 N.L.R.B. 230 (1981), enforced, No. 82-3049 (3d Cir.
Nov. 26, 1982).
Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Carpet Yarn Div., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 304
(1981), affd, 691 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1083 (1982).
Stanley M. Fiel, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 1154 (1980), affd, 674 F.2d 567
(6th Cir. 1982).
St. Francis Hosp., 263 N.L.R.B. 834 (1982), affd, 729 F.2d 844
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
Suburban Ford, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 364 (1980), modified, 646 F.2d
1244 (8th Cir. 1981). [Case includes 2 bargaining units. Bargain-
ing order enforced in one and not enforced in other.]
Tartan Marine Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 646 (1980), enforced in part, de-
nied in part, No. 80-1072 (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 1981).
Tipton Elec. Co., 242 N.L.R.B. 202 (1979), affd, 621 F.2d 890 (8th
Cir. 1980).
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Tucker Enter., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B 1188 (1978), affd, 651 F.2d 457
(6th Cir. 1980).
United Oil Mfg. Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 1320 (1981), affd, 672 F.2d 1208
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
United Serv. for the Handicapped, 251 N.L.R.B. 823 (1980), affd,
678 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1982).
Valley Plaza, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 537 (1981), affd, 715 F.2d 237 (6th
Cir. 1983).
Village IX, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 908 (1982), modified, 723 F.2d 1360
(7th Cir. 1983).
Warehouse Groceries Management, Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 252 (1981),
affd, No. 81-7487 (11th Cir. July 6, 1982).
Washington Beef Producers, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1163 (1982), enforced,
No. 83-7212 (9th Cir. June 7, 1984).
Wehrenberg Theatres, Inc., 260 N.L.R.B. 18, affd, 690 F.2d 159 (8th
Cir. 1982).
Wilhow Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. 303 (1979), affd, 666 F.2d 1294 (10th
Cir. 1981).
Winco Petroleum Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 1118 (1979), 668 F.2d 973 (8th
Cir. 1982).
Zale Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1979), enforced, No. 79-7057 (9th
Cir. May 5, 1980).
Zero Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 495 (1982), enforced, Nos. 82-1561, 82-
1711 (1st Cir. Jan. 7, 1983).
